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ed, as in this case, by the court declaring that the real duty is to
secure for the cestui que trust the benefits intended by the settlor
and to accomplish this purpose deviation may be necessary.9
The principle is well settled that courts will allow deviation when
the provisions of the trust involve illegality,"° impossibility" or
Where the purpose of the trust has been achieved.)"
In the instant case the Court allowed the trustee to invest in
corporate stocks, not on the basis of advantage to the beneficiary,
but because of changed economic conditions. If deviation were
not permitted, accomplishment of the purposes of the trusts would
be substantially impaired. This holding seems to be justified on the
basis of the necessity involved and it should have no adverse effect
on future litigation since each case must be decided on its own
merits.
Admittedly then, the expressed intention of the settlor is not
immutably controlling as is commonly asserted. Examination reveals
that the court of equity possesses appreciable discretion in passing
on the intangibles of necessity and so-called dominant intention.
Further, court authorized modification creates an inconsequential
effect on future litigation for each case must be decided on its
own merits with the :measure of the court varying as did the
traditional "foot of the chancellor".
RALPH MELLOM
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICA-
TION - INTERPRETATION OF THE "ESTABLISHMENT" CLAUSE. During
the course of collective bargaining negotiations, the employees of
two stores of a nine store food market chain voted to strike. The
employees of all nine stores were represented by the same local
union. The stores were all branch stores and situated within the
metropolitan area, the general office and all managerial depart-
9. Hoffman v. First Bond ind Mortgage Co., 116 Conn. 320, 164 A. 656 (1933);
Mass v. Reed, 184 11. 263, 56 N.E. 306 (1900); Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Glunz, 119
N.J. Eq. 73, 181 A. 27 (1935); In re Pulitzer's Estate, 139 Misc. Rep. 575, 249 N.Y.S.
87 (1931); Ruggles v. Tyson, 104 Wis. 500, 79 N.W. 766, 768 (1899) (The Court pro-
vided a good statement of the general rule: "Rather than that the scheme of the creator
of such estate shall entirely fail by reason of some circumstance not forseen by him and
provided for, the court may intervene, but only for the purpose of, and so far as necessary,
to preserve the property.").
10. See Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S.W. 1057 (1921) (after prohibition, co-
operage was infeasible, held deviation allowed); cf. Gouy Shong v. Chew Shee, 254 Mass.
484, 150 N.E. 225 (1926); RESTATEMENT (Second), Tnusrs § 166 "(1959).
11. In re Young's Will, 178 Misc. 378,'34 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1942); see Sturgeon v.
Stevens, 186 Pa. 350, 40 A. 488 (1898); RESTATEMENT (Second), TRUSTS §, 165 (1959).
12. Simmons v. Northwestern Trust Co., 136 Minn. 357, 162 N.W. 450 (1917).
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ments being located in a nearby city. Subsequent to the walkout
at the two stores, the employer locked up the seven remaining
stores. The claimants, employees in this latter group of stores,
applied for Unemployment Compensation benefits, maintaining
that the branch stores were in fact separate "establishments" under
the Minnesota Employment Security Act,' which disqualifies in-
dividuals who lose employment because of a labor dispute. The
claimants were granted benefits. Upon appeal by the employer, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held, two justices dissenting, the decision
reversed. The court concluded that the nine stores were in fact
integral parts of the same unit of employments, therefore constitut-
ed a single "establishment" under the statute. Weiss v. Klein Super
Markets, Inc., 108 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1961).
All state and federal unemployment compensation statutes con-
tain provisions which disqualify individuals unemployed as a result
of labor disputes. 2 Some statutes use the term "establishment,"3 and
others use the terms "factory, establishment or other premises". 4
However, courts usually hold that either phrase in no way changes
the applicability of the statute.'
Several tests have been applied by the courts in interpreting the
meaning of the phrase. In the more recent decisions, the courts
have construed the issue of separate establishments on the relative
interdependence of the components from the point of view of
organizational unity,' giving consideration to functional integrality,7
geographical location (or physical proximity),' or weighing both
tests equally in the light of the facts presented.'
1. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 268.09 (1) (1945) disqualifies individuals for benefits, "(6)
If such individual has left or partially or totally lost his employment with an employer
because of a strike or other labor dispute. Such disqualification shall prevail for each week
during which such strike or other labor dispute is in progress at the establishment in which
he is or was employed ....
2. U. S. Bureou of Employment Security, Dep't. of Labor, Comparison of State Un-
employment Insurance Laws as of January 1, 1960, p. 102.
3. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. supra note 1.
4. E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 52-06-02 (4) (1961).
5. Ford Motor Co. v. Div. of Employment Security, 326 Mass. 757, 96 N.E.2d 859
(1951); Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 42 N.W.2d 576 (1950); Ford Motor
Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n., 191 Va. 812, 62 S.E.2d 28 (1951).
6. General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 55 A.2d 732 (1947); Spielmann
v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 Wisc. 240, 295 N.W. 1 (1940); see Tucker v. American
Smelting and Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A.2d 692 (1947).
7. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Sakrison, 71 Ariz. 219, 225 P.2d 707 (1950);
Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950); Spielman v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, supra note 7. Contra, Park v. Appeal Board of Michigan Employment
Security Comm'n, 355 Mich. 103, 94 N.W.2d 407 (1959).
8. Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 II. 32, 53 N.E.2d 390 (1944); Ford Motor Co.
v. Div. of Employment Security, 326 Mass. 757, 96 N.E.2d 859 (1951); Ford Motor Co.
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 446, 79 A.2d 121 (1951).
9. See Snook v. International Harvester Co., 276 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1955); Adamski
v. State, 108 Ohio App. 198, 161 N.E.2d 907 (1959); Neidlinger v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 170 Pa. Super. 166, 84 A.2d 363 (1951).
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A scruitiny of the cases reveals a tendency in recent years for
courts to apply a more strict interpretation to the "establishment"
clauses. These authorities hold that the unity which must be present
be a unity of employment rather than a unity of purpose.1" In the
instant case, the court upheld the unity of employment doctrine
which it first set forth in the landmark case Nordling v. Ford Motor
Co.
In the absence of any North Dakota decisions in point, and of
any expression of legislative intent, it is submitted that the courts
of this state should construe our "establishment" clause from the
more modern poirt of view of unity of employment.
L. LECLERC
10. Ford Motor Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 243 S.W.2d
657 (Ky. 1951); Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 42 N.W.2d 576 (1950);
Kroger Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Missouri, 314 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. 1958); Machcinski v.
Ford Motor Co., 277 App. Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1951).
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